气象资料共享管理办法
中国气象局
气象资料共享管理办法
2001年12月21日
国家气象局
第一章 总则
第一条 为了加强气象资料共享，进一步促进气象资料更好地为经济建设、国防建设、社会发展和人民生活服务，依据《中华人民共和国气象法》有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条 各级气象主管机构组织提供气象资料共享，以及用户使用其提供共享的气象资料，应当遵守本办法。
第三条 本办法所称气象资料， 是指各级气象主管机构组织收集并存档的各种气象观（探）测记录，以及由这些记录加工处理而成的各类气象数据集、各种气候统计值和数值分析资料等。
第四条 国务院气象主管机构负责全国气象资料共享工作的管理。地方各级气象主管机构负责本行政区域内气象资料共享工作的管理。第五条 提供涉密气象资料共享，以及使用、保管共享的涉密气象资料，应当遵守《中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法》和《气象部门保守国家秘密实施细则》等有关规定。第二章 共享气象资料的提供 第六条 各级气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位，应当通过网络适时、滚动向社会发布下列基本气象资料，供公众无偿下载：
（一）我国参加世界气象组织全球通信系统（GTS）交换的地面气象站的定时（4次）观测报告和高空站的定时（2次）观测报告；
（二）我国参加地面气候资料国际交换的气象站（附录1）的气温、气压、湿度、风、降水、日照等要素的当年的月、年统计值。第七条 各级气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位，应当免费向从事气象工作的机构、事业单位开展的公益服务、非营利性科研和教育机构从事的非商业性活动提供所需的气象资料。有关部门和单位与气象部门合作开展的业务和科研项目所需的气象资料，按双方建立合作关系时商定的原则和方法处理。为企业、事业单位从事的经营性活动提供所需的气象资料，除收取资料复制和交付成本费外，可以补偿性收取资料加工处理费。第八条 各级气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位，为各级党委、人民政府及其防灾减灾机构，以及外国驻华使馆、领事馆、联合国驻华机构提供其开展公务活动所需的气象资料，不收取费用。
第九条 国务院气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位，向用户提供从其他国家气象部门交换来的气象资料，必须遵守有关国家气象部门提供交换资料时附加的使用限制条件。各级气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位，向用户提供从其他从事气象工作的机构、有关部门和科研单位交换来的资料，应当遵守有关机构、部门和单位提供交换资料时附加的使用限制条件。第十条 各级气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位，只负责提供本级气象主管机构组织收集和存档的气象资料。除各级气象主管机构负责共享气象资料提供工作的单位之外，各级气象主管机构所属的其他单位和个人不得从事或变相从事气象资料提供工作。 第三章 共享气象资料的使用 第十一条 用户要求提供气象资料时，应当凭有效证件，并提交包括所索取气象资料的用途、类别、范围、数量，以及是否涉外使用等内容的证明文件。
第十二条 用户对各级气象主管机构组织提供的气象资料，只享有有限的、不排他的使用权。
第十三条 用户不得有偿或无偿转让其从各级气象主管机构获得的气象资料，包括用户对这些气象资料进行单位换算、介质转换或者量度变换后形成的新资料，以及对其进行实质性加工后形成的新资料。第十四条 用户不得直接将其从各级气象主管机构获得的气象资料，用作向外分发或供外部使用的数据库、产品和服务的一部分，也不得间接用作生成它们的基础。用户从各级气象主管机构获得气象资料，可以在内部分发；可以存放在仅供本单位使用的局域网上，但不得与广域网、互联网相连接。第十五条 用户从各级气象主管机构获得的用于非经营性活动的气象资料，不得用于经营性活动。第四章 罚则第十六条 违反本办法规定，有下列行为之一的，由有关气象主管机构责令其改正，给予警告，并处以一万元以下罚款；情节严重的，停止向其提供气象资料。 （一）将所获得的气象资料或者这些气象资料的使用权，向国内外其他单位和个人无偿转让的；（二）将所获得气象资料直接向外分发或用作供外部使用的数据库、产品和服务的一部分，或者间接用作生成它们的基础的；（三）将存放所获得气象资料的局域网与广域网、互联网相连接的；（四）将所获得气象资料进行单位换算、介质转换或者量度变换后形成的新资料，或者对所获得气象资料进行实质性加工后形成的新资料向外分发的；（五）不按要求使用从国内外交换来的气象资料的。 第十七条 违反本办法规定，将所获得的气象资料或者这些气象资料的使用权，向国内外其他单位和个人有偿转让的，由有关气象主管机构责令其改正，给予警告，并处以三万元以下的罚款；情节严重的，停止向其提供气象资料。
第十八条 违反本办法规定，将通过网络无偿下载的或按公益使用免费获取的气象资料，用于经营性活动的，由有关气象主管机构责令其改正，给予警告，并处以五万元以下罚款。情节严重的，停止向其提供气象资料。
第十九条 违反本办法规定，有下列行为之一的，由有关气象主管机构责令其限期改正；情节严重的，对责任人员依法给予行政处分：
（一）不适时向社会发布基本气象资料的；（二）不免费向从事气象工作的机构、国内非营利性科研和教育机构从事的非商业性活动提供气象资料的；（三）不及时向各级党委、人民政府，以及外国驻华使馆、领事馆、联合国驻华机构提供其开展公务活动所需气象资料的；（四）向用户提供与其他国家气象部门交换来的气象资料，不遵守有关国家气象部门提供交换资料时附加的使用限制条件的；（五）向用户提供与其他从事气象工作的机构、有关部门和科研单位交换来的气象等资料，不遵守有关机构、部门和单位提供交换资料时附加的使用限制条件的。第二十条 提供涉密气象资料共享，以及使用、保管共享的涉密气象资料，不遵守《中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法》和《气象部门保守国家秘密实施细则》等法律、法规等规定的，由有关部门依照上述法律、法规的规定进行处罚。第五章 附则
第二十一条 本办法中下列术语的含义是：
（一）用户，是指独立法人单位，不含其下属单位。
（二）免费，按世界气象组织40号（Cg-XII）决议给出的定义，是指除复制和交付资料所需的成本费外，不再征收任何资料采集和存档所花的费用。
（三）资料复制和交付成本费，是指为用户提供气象资料过程中对气象资料检索、摘录、加工、复制所需的人员工时、设备损耗、能源消耗以及复制载体、通讯传输等项费用。
（四）资料加工处理费，是指对所收集的气象资料进行加工处理和归档所需的人员工时、设备损耗、能源消耗等项费用。
第二十二条 为索取气象资料的外国机构和个人提供气象资料，可参照本办法有关条款的规定执行。
第二十三条 各级气象主管机构可以根据本办法制定具体的实施办法。
第二十四条 本办法由国务院气象主管机构负责解释。
第二十五条 本办法自公布之日起执行。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
